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Abstract 
 
There is a common perception that low productivity or low growth is due 
to what can be called an “innovation shortfall,” usually identified as a low 
rate of investment in research and development (R&D) compared with 
some high-innovation countries. The usual reaction to this perceived 
problem is to call for increases in R&D investment rates, usually 
specifying a target that can be as high as 3 percent of GDP. The problem 
with this analysis is that it fails to see that a low R&D investment rate may 
be appropriate given the economy’s pattern of specialization, or may be 
just one manifestation of more general problems that impede accumulation 
of all kinds of capital. When does a country suffer from an innovation 
shortfall above and beyond the ones that should be expected given its 
specialization and accumulation patterns? This is the question tackled in 
this paper. First, it shows a simple way to estimate the R&D gap that can 
be explained by a country’s specialization pattern, and illustrates this with 
the case of Chile. The analysis finds that although Chile’s specialization in 
natural-resource-intensive sectors explains part of its R&D gap, a 
significant shortfall remains. Second, it shows how a calibrated model can 
be used to determine the R&D gap that should be expected given a 
country’s investment in physical and human capital. If the actual R&D gap 
is above this expected gap, the country suffers from a true innovation 
shortfall. 
  31. Introduction 
 
The common perception is that low productivity or low growth in both developed and 
developing countries is due to a lack of innovation. Exhibit number one in favor of this 
argument is a relatively low research and development (R&D) investment rate as a share 
of gross domestic product (GDP), a common proxy for innovative activity. Some recent 
publications, for example, have noted with concern that Latin American countries invest 
an average of roughly 0.4 percent of GDP in R&D, whereas most OECD countries’ R&D 
investment rates hover around 2 percent of GDP.
1  
  The reaction to this perceived problem is to recommend increasing R&D 
spending up to some target rate based on the R&D investment rates of high-innovation 
countries. Thus, in pursuit of turning the European Union into the most competitive 
knowledge-based economy in the world, the March 2002 meeting of the European 
Council in Barcelona announced the goal of increasing average investment in R&D from 
1.9 to 3 percent by 2010. The objective is to close the gap with the United States (2.7 
percent) and Japan (3.0 percent).
2 In another example, President Ricardo Lagos of Chile 
recently stated that his country should reach an R&D investment rate of 1.5 percent by 
2010.
3  
  The problem with these benchmarking exercises and targets is the failure to 
recognize that R&D investment is just one more activity whose level is determined by the 
economy’s pattern of specialization as well as by overall economic incentives and 
distortions. Should the natural resource-abundant economies of South America invest as 
much in R&D as the manufacturing-oriented countries of East Asia do? Are innovation 
policies crucial for countries whose low R&D investment rates may just be one more 
manifestation of general problems that impede accumulation of all kinds of capital? What 
is the level at which a country suffers from an innovation shortfall above and beyond the 
ones that should be expected given the country’s specialization and accumulation 
patterns? These are the questions this paper tackles. Because of Chile’s commitment to 
                                                           
1 See OECD (2004), World Bank Institute (2005), and De Ferranti et al. (2003). 
2 See OECD (2004).  
3 Ricardo Lagos, Discourse on the State of the Nation, May 21, 2005 (see http://www.gobiernodechile.cl/21 
mayo2004/indice_discursos.asp). 
  4the innovation agenda, and its previous far-reaching micro-reforms, it serves as an 
illustration of the proposed analysis. Thus, the paper provides a general exploration of 
ways to identify innovation shortfalls and an analysis of whether Chile suffers from one.  
  The next section explores the relationship between R&D investment rates and 
specialization patterns. Based on data at the OECD level, R&D investment rates vary 
tremendously across sectors, from 0.2 percent of value added in publishing, printing, and 
reproduction of recorded media and construction; to 25 percent in pharmaceuticals; and 
27 percent in office, accounting, and computing machinery. Clearly, if for exogenous 
reasons a country is specialized in sectors characterized by low innovation, then it would 
not be surprising to find that it spends relatively little on R&D. Ideally, the analysis 
would directly compare R&D investment rates in the same sector across countries; 
unfortunately, such data are not available for developing countries. Thus, we perform an 
indirect analysis, asking how much R&D investment rates would fall in OECD countries 
if they had the economic structure of a resource rich Latin America country, using Chile 
as an example. The results suggest that compositional matters are relevant but do not 
explain a large part of the country’s innovation shortfall. 
  The third section turns to the question of whether low R&D investment rates 
should be seen as innovation shortfalls caused by environments that adversely affect 
innovation, or as part of a broader problem of low accumulation in all types of capital. 
Put differently, the question is whether a country’s low R&D investment results from 
problems common to accumulation overall or the activity of innovation itself is somehow 
especially impeded. The appropriate policy depends critically on the answer to this 
question.  
  For example, Chile had an R&D investment rate of 0.4 percent of GDP in 1995, 
which was well below the comparable number for the United States (2.5 percent in 1995). 
It is tempting to conclude that Chile has an innovation shortfall; however, it also has low 
investment rates in human and physical capital, as reflected in a composite capital-output 
ratio of 50 percent of the U.S. level.
4 Perhaps whatever leads Chile to have low 
                                                           
4 The composite capita-output ratio includes both human and physical capital, and is given by 
, where h is human capital per worker (measured as  , where 
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  5investment rates in human and physical capital may also explain its low R&D investment 
rate. Figure 1 extends this analysis to 48 countries for which the required data are 
available for 1995. The figure shows a positive relationship between R&D investment as 
a share of GDP and the composite capital-output ratio. Again, the conclusion is that—at 
least for some countries—low R&D investment rates could be just part of a more general 
accumulation problem. 
  The challenge that emerges, then, is to find a way to identify true innovation 
shortfalls and separate them from cases of low overall accumulation (or accumulation 
problems).
5 For this purpose, we propose the use of a model developed and calibrated by 
Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare (2005) that captures the interactions among accumulation 
of different types of capital, including knowledge capital, and allows for both barriers to 
general accumulation and barriers that are specific to the accumulation of knowledge. We 
explore the model’s implications for Latin American countries and find some countries 
that seem to suffer from true innovation shortfalls. However, the results from this 
analysis are extremely preliminary because the exercise suffers both from large 
measurement error intrinsic to the use of international data sets, such as those of Barro 
and Lee (2000) and the Penn World Tables 6.1, as well as model misspecification for 
some countries. To explore these issues, the analysis considers the case of Chile and 
shows that some particular adjustments to the model are necessary for a more appropriate 
analysis. After such adjustments, the conclusion that emerges is that Chile does indeed 
suffer from a true innovation shortfall: its R&D investment rate is significantly below 
what would be expected given its stocks of human and physical capital. Still, the goal 
here is not so much to reach a solid conclusion for any particular country, but to illustrate 
how this kind of analysis might be undertaken. Even for the case of Chile, a more careful 
analysis is called for. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
coefficient and s is the average years of schooling of the adult population), K is the stock of capital, Y is 
total output, and α  is the share of capital in output (see below for a formal derivation). 
5 In part, this paper is inspired by the recent contribution by Hausmann, Rodrik, and Velasco (2004), in 
which the authors argue that different countries may be affected by different binding constraints to growth, 
and that the goal of development economics should be to identify those constraints. A significant difference 
in the approach here is that whereas Hausmann, Rodrik, and Velasco argue for looking at shadow prices, 
this paper instead looks at quantities but uses theory to infer the corresponding shadow prices.  
  6  The fourth section briefly discusses possible explanations presented in the 
literature for true innovation shortfalls, again focusing on the case of Chile. The paper 
ends by calling for more research both for improving the methodology to identify 
innovation shortfalls, and for finding the most important determinants of such shortfalls 
in specific countries. 
 
2. R&D and the Pattern of Specialization 
 
There is enormous variation in R&D investment rates across sectors, reflecting the fact 
that, just as with physical and human capital, some sectors are more intensive in 
knowledge capital relative to others. This has important implications for comparisons of 
R&D investment rates across countries. In a multi-sector economy with international 
trade, countries specialize in sectors with differing possibilities for technological change, 
so that significant gaps in R&D investment rates are consistent with factor price 
equalization and hence similar wage levels (see Grossman and Helpman, 1991). 
Although income levels would be higher in an economy with higher R&D rates (since it 
would enjoy a higher stock of knowledge capital per worker), under reasonable 
conditions it would not be appropriate for countries to encourage the growth of high-
R&D sectors. The next section discusses this point by briefly reviewing the relevant 
theory. The following subsection looks at the R&D data at the sector level to gauge the 
extent to which differences in specialization patterns may explain a significant part of the 
R&D insufficiency in developing countries such as Chile. 
 
R&D Rates in a Multi-Sector Economy: Implications from Trade Theory 
 
Although the paper focuses on R&D and knowledge capital, this section presents the 
discussion in the more familiar setting of investment and physical capital based on the 
Hecksher-Ohlin (HO) model with capital accumulation. Later the analysis includes 
Ricardian productivity differences, differences in income taxes, and externalities. 
Consider a model of a small open economy, two factors of production (capital and 
labor), and two goods that differ in their capital intensity. Let the two goods be 1 and 2, 
with 1 being labor intensive and serving as the numeraire. Assume that capital is 
  7produced with a technology that is identical to the one that produces good 1, and assume 
that there is no depreciation, so that the rental rate of capital is equal to the net rate of 
return to capital (see Findlay, 1995). Technology is identical in the small economy and in 
the rest of the world (ROW). International prices are determined in the ROW. From the 
Stolper-Samuelson Theorem, under certain regularity conditions there is a unique and 
positive relationship between the rate of return to capital and the relative price of good 2. 
If the instantaneous intertemporal discount rate is ρ, then the long-run equilibrium in the 
ROW is such that the rate of return to capital is ρ, which pins down the relative price of 
good 2.  
Figure 2 illustrates the equilibrium analysis for the small open economy. The 
horizontal axis measures k, the capital-labor ratio, and the vertical axis measures r, the 
rate of return to capital. The curve ri(k) denotes the equilibrium rate of return to capital 
given an economy-wide capital-labor endowment of k if there is complete specialization 
in sector i. Decreasing marginal returns to capital imply that the curves ri(k) are 
downward sloping. Let ki be defined implicitly by ri(k) = ρ. According to standard HO 
analysis, if k is exogenous, then the allocation of resources between sectors 1 and 2 is 
determined by k: if k is equal to k1 or lower there would be complete specialization in 
good 1, whereas if k is equal to k2 or higher there would be complete specialization in 
good 2. There is factor price equalization if k is in between these two extremes, whereas 
the rate of return is higher (lower) than the world’s rate of return if k is lower than k1 
(higher than k2). For any level of k between the two extremes, the allocation of capital 
between sectors 1 and 2 is just such that the equilibrium rate of return is equal to ρ. 
Hence, the bold line in Figure 1 gives the equilibrium rate of return as a function of the 
capital-labor ratio. 
When there is endogenous capital accumulation in the small open economy, if the 
rate of discount is the same as in the ROW, then there is indeterminacy in the steady-state 
capital-labor ratio, and the economy is indifferent among all these points. On the other 
hand, if the economy has a discount rate higher than ρ, meaning it is more impatient than 
the ROW, then it will have a capital-labor ratio lower than k1, it will specialize in the 
labor-intensive good, and it will have a higher equilibrium rate of return to capital. The 
  8same would occur if the small economy has an income tax that is higher than in the 
ROW. Thus, the first result is that comparative advantage in a long-run HO model is 
determined by the policies and preferences that affect capital accumulation. Translated to 
R&D terminology, countries with more favorable policies toward innovation would 
specialize in R&D-intensive sectors, have higher R&D investment rates in each sector 
and for the whole economy, and attain higher income levels. 
But consider now what happens if there are Ricardian productivity differences. 
This is relevant because, as has been pointed out in the literature, when the capital stock 
is endogenous, the long-run production possibilities frontier becomes flat. Hence, just as 
in the Ricardian model, sector-specific productivity differences would completely 
determine comparative advantage and the pattern of specialization. To see this, imagine 
that the small economy has a Ricardian productivity that is lower in sector 2 relative to 
the ROW. The analysis for the small economy is exactly as above, but it is as if the 
international price of good 2 is lower. A lower international price for good 2 implies that 
the curve r2(k) is shifted downward relative to the original curve, with points k1 and k2 
moved to the right, so that the new equilibrium-returns curve as a function of k has the 
same shape as above, but moved southeast. This implies that if the small economy has the 
same discount rate as the ROW, it will specialize in good 1 and use the same capital-
labor ratio in the production of this good as the ROW.  
The relevance of this finding for understanding the role of specialization patterns 
in explaining R&D gaps across countries is the following: if a country’s lower R&D 
investment rate is entirely caused by its specialization in low-R&D-intensive sectors, then 
the whole R&D gap should be explained by the country’s sector structure, with the same 
R&D investment rates across each sector. In other words, if an economy’s R&D 
investment rate is the weighted average of the sector R&D rates with weights given by 
the shares of each sector in total output, then a Ricardian story would lead to differences 
in R&D rates entirely driven by differences in the weights but not in the sector R&D 
rates. The analysis will check whether this is indeed the case. 
Summing up, an economy can specialize in good 1 either because it has a higher 
discount rate, a higher income tax, or a Ricardian comparative advantage in good 1. In 
  9the first two cases, both sector specific R&D gaps and sector composition differences 
explain differences in R&D investment rates across countries. In the third case (that is, 
Ricardian comparative advantage), sector composition would be solely responsible for 
international differences in R&D spending. Note also that the only case where it could 
make sense to do something about the fact that the economy is specialized in a low-R&D 




Now imagine that there are sector-specific (Marshallian) externalities. As shown in 
Rodríguez-Clare (2005), the problem that may arise in this case is that the economy may 
have a comparative advantage in good 2 and experience a coordination failure that keeps 
it specialized in sector 1. This is of course the classic analysis of sector-specific 
externalities and trade, where an economy may be in a bad equilibrium, specialized in a 
sector where it does not have a comparative advantage. If this were the case, then a policy 
inducing specialization in sector 2 would lead to higher investment rates, a higher steady-
state capital-labor ratio, and higher total factor productivity (TFP) arising from 
specialization in the sector with comparative advantage. 
What does this mean for the case of a developing country? Translating again to 
R&D terminology, if the developing country has a Ricardian comparative advantage in 
R&D-intensive sectors with sector specific and local spillovers, then it could make sense 
to think of a policy to induce a reallocation of resources toward the more R&D-intensive 
sectors. This would lead to an increasing R&D investment rate. But does it make sense to 
think that Chile, for example, has a Ricardian comparative advantage in more R&D 
sectors? Probably not. 
There is a case that can be made for a policy to induce specialization in high-
R&D sectors. The previous argument applies to the case where externalities or R&D 
spillovers are entirely within industry. A different result emerges if R&D generates 
positive economy-wide (inter-industry) spillovers. In that case, it is easy to show that an 
economy could be justified in sacrificing efficiency through specialization in sectors 
where it does not have a comparative advantage to attain higher R&D investment rates 
  10and enjoy the associated spillovers. In fact, some of the discussion that took place in the 
United States when it was feared that it was losing its edge in semiconductors can be 
interpreted in this way. Commentators such as Laura Tyson argued that semiconductors 
generate strong inter-industry externalities, and that therefore it is important to have a 
domestic semiconductor industry even if this runs counter to comparative advantage 
(Borrus, Tyson, and Zysman 1986).  
For this to be a valid argument, however, knowledge spillovers associated with 
R&D would have to be stronger across domestic firms than across firms in different 
countries. Indeed, if spillovers are international, then it would clearly not make sense for 
a country to intervene because any market failures would be international in scope, and 
hence national economy policy is clearly not the correct type of intervention. There is 
some controversy on this matter. For instance, Irwin and Klenow (1994) find that 
learning-by-doing spillovers in the semiconductor industry are as strong internationally as 
domestically, and the more general evidence seems to show that domestic spillovers are 
stronger since knowledge spillovers are clearly attenuated by distance (Audretsch and 
Feldman, 2003). 
Ultimately, then, this is an empirical matter. If R&D spillovers go beyond sectors 
but stay mostly within borders, policies that push resources toward high-R&D sectors 
should not be discarded. Of course, favoring high-R&D sectors may not be the most 
standard way to encourage R&D; a more conventional approach would be simply to 
subsidize R&D. But if for practical reasons the latter approach is not advisable, then 
perhaps a sector approach is relevant. As with any policy option, however, there are 
significant costs and risks that would have to be carefully considered. 
Before going any further with the policy discussion, however, it is necessary first 
to explore whether in fact there are significant systematic differences in R&D intensities 
across sectors, and whether this can explain a significant part of the shortfalls in R&D in 
developing countries (and in Chile in particular).  
 
  11A Look at Sector-Level R&D Data 
 
This section first examines how R&D investment varies across sectors for the OECD 
since developing country data do not yet permit this kind of exercise. Table 1 reveals 
several important stylized facts.  First, there is a wide range of average R&D investment 
rates by sector, from around 0.1 percent in services, apparel, or publishing to almost 30 
percent in pharmaceuticals; office, accounting, and computing equipment and air and 
spacecraft. Second, there is tremendous variation of investment rates within sectors. In 
manufacturing in the aggregate, for example, Spain holds up the bottom with 2 percent, 
while Sweden tops the list at close to 12 percent.  Looking at just the pharmaceuticals 
sector, Spain invests less than 10 percent of value added while Sweden invests more than 
40 percent. Third, overall, individual sector investment rates have tended to rise, 
suggesting an increasing intensity in the use of knowledge in the production of these 
products.  Fourth, sector composition appears to matter.  The declining aggregate R&D 
investment rates across this period, partially a phenomenon of this particular sample cut, 
is driven by the fact that OECD countries have moved heavily into services, which make 
up more than 4 percentage points of total nonagricultural value added in many OECD 
countries.
6 Hence, as a first pass, increases in aggregate R&D investment rates occur both 
from increasing R&D investment in existing sectors and from shifting into more intensive 
sectors.  
A more careful decomposition of differences in aggregate R&D investment (RDI) 
rates within the OECD suggests a combination of both elements with wide variations 
across countries (see Figures 3 and 4).  The RDIs in the United States and France are 
higher than the mean largely due to higher investment rates within the mean set of 
sectors. Finland and Korea’s high RDIs and Canada, Australia, Netherlands, and 
Norway’s lower RDIs are due largely to compositional effects—electronics in the former 
and perhaps natural resources in the latter. In the newly emerging Eastern European 
countries and Poland, Spain, and Czech Republic, the deficit is due almost entirely to low 
investment rates within sectors.  In the manufacturing sector (not shown), the story is 
mixed.  Again, the deficits of the younger countries are due largely to low within-sector 
                                                           
6 This trend represents a continuation of that identified by Bernard and Jones (1996) from 1970 to 1990. 
  12investment rates. In the wealthier countries there is a mix, with Germany’s superiority 
and to a lesser extent Japan’s due largely to within-sector rates, while others, such as 
Finland, Belgium, Canada, and the United States, are driven more prominently by sector 
composition.  
To get a feel for what is happening in Chile, which lacks comparable rates of 
R&D investment at the sector level, the analysis takes an indirect route. The first column 
of Table 2 applies Chile’s industrial structure to the sector investment rates in each 
country in the OECD.  Column 3 relates this simulated value to the actual value.  It is 
clear that structure is not everything.  Norway’s predicted level is within 10 percent of its 
actual level, suggesting that the fact that its RDI is double Chile’s is significantly due to 
low investment rates in existing sectors. However, it is also clear that structure matters.  
On average, simulated OECD aggregate investment rates are just under 60 percent of 
those observed; Finland and Germany, are roughly 30 percent of their actual.   
Table 3 looks at which sectors are most responsible for these large disparities by 
applying the average OECD sector investment rates to the difference between Chile’s and 
the aggregate OECD’s sector participation rates.  Virtually the entire difference can be 
accounted for by Chile’s low participation in the electronics and transport sectors, both of 
which show high average investment rates.  The fact that Chile did not add Nokia to its 
forestry industry the way Finland did explains the vast difference in the two countries’ 
simulated rates.  
Chile’s low R&D comes in part from its specialization in sectors with low R&D 
intensity, but this is not the whole explanation. There is also a significant gap that comes 
from lower R&D investment rates at the sector level. The next section explores whether 
the lower R&D investment rates can be seen as a consequence of a specific innovation 
shortfall or of a broader problem of low accumulation of all kinds of capital. 
 
3. A Model of Knowledge Capital Accumulation 
 
There is a long literature that tries to understand the relative contribution of capital 
accumulation and productivity growth to economic growth. More recently, research has 
focused on what is sometimes called “development accounting,” the goal of which is to 
  13understand the determinants of income differences across countries at a particular point in 
time. In particular, the exercise explores whether a country’s low income level is due to 
low investment in physical or human capital, or to a low TFP level. One problem with 
development accounting is that it is almost never acknowledged that TFP, just as the 
stock of physical and human capital, is the result of investments in some kind of capital, 
perhaps organizational capital or technology. In other words, TFP is also the result of 
accumulation of some sort. 
  To tackle this issue and undertake a more meaningful development accounting 
exercise, Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare (2005) formulate a model in which TFP is the 
result of accumulation decisions. The authors used the model to explore the relevance and 
magnitude of international spillovers. They also investigate whether policies that affect 
appropriability in general, together with exogenous differences in the relative price of 
investment goods and investment levels in human capital, can explain the international 
variance of income levels. The authors are interested in whether the analysis should 
postulate significant differences across countries in the treatment of innovation and 
technology adoption. They conclude that the latter element is important: to explain 
differences in labor productivity across countries, it is necessary to assume that there are 
significant cross-country differences in policies or institutions that affect the cost of 
technology adoption.  
This section applies the framework of Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare to understand 
the reasons behind a developing country’s low income level. Perhaps there are some 
countries where low income is due to low appropriability, others where low income is 
due to low human capital, others where it is mainly due to a high relative price of 
investment, and yet others where low income is due to a high implicit cost of technology 
adoption. In a sense, this framework can be used to conduct a sort of R&D diagnostics to 
determine whether a country suffers from low R&D beyond what would be expected 
given its low investment in other types of capital. The case of Chile provides an 
illustration for the methodology and for discussing its advantages and disadvantages, as 
well as the way in which it is sensitive to different assumptions. 
  14As customary, the model is based on a Cobb-Douglas production function of the 
form  , where Y is total output, K is the physical capital stock, A is a 
technology index, h is average human capital per worker, and L is the total labor force. 
Following the Mincer specification,  , where s is years of schooling and is assumed 
constant and exogenous. Output can be used for consumption (C), investment (I), or 
research (R),  , where
α α − =




p IR + p  is the relative price of investment and is assumed 
constant through time.  Physical capital is accumulated according to: KI K δ =− & .  
The only thing left to specify is the way A evolves. A complete description is 
beyond the scope of this paper, and the reader is referred to Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare 
(2005). This section provides a brief sketch. First, there is a world technology frontier, 
denoted by A*, that increases thanks to the R&D performed in all countries. The rate of 
growth of A* is denoted by  .  A g
Second, each country’s A relative to the world level—which is denoted by 
 —is determined by the country’s efforts in technology adoption, which the 
model equalizes to a broad concept of R&D.
7 Thus, R&D in the model has two functions: 
it contributes to increasing the world’s technology level frontier and it allows the country 
to come closer to the world’s frontier (that is, decreasing  ). Given that R&D is more 
effective in increasing the country’s A when the country has a lower relative level of A 
(that is, there are benefits of backwardness), then low R&D does not translate into lower 
growth, but rather into a lower steady-state relative A, with all countries in steady state 
growing at a common rate. Moreover, there is also a free flow of ideas from the rest of 
the world to any particular country, and this happens at a rate denoted by 
* / A A a =
a
ε . It is also 
assumed that the basic productivity in R&D is the same across countries, although actual 
labor productivity in R&D may differ due to differences in the amounts of physical and 
human capital. This basic productivity in R&D is denoted by λ . Thus, 
 
() ( /1 / AR L AA A λε =+ − & ) *   
 
  15In steady state we have: 







A 1  
where   is R&D as a share of GDP (i.e.,  R s Y R sR / ≡ ) and   is the 
“composite” capital-output ratio (incorporating both physical and human capital).  
) 1 /( ) / (
α α − ≡ Y K h k
As usual,  , so that labor productivity is the product of the 
technology index and the capital-output ratio. This expression takes into account that—
just as in the neoclassical model—an increase in A leads to an increase in the rate of 
return to capital, so that to bring the economy back to steady state, an increase in the 
capital-labor ratio is called for. The full effect of an increase in A, taking into account the 
indirect effect through induced capital accumulation, is a proportional increase in labor 
productivity (see Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare, 1997). There is an additional interaction 
between A and k since k positively affects  . The reason for this is that R&D uses the 
same technology as production of output, which relies on human and physical capital. 
Hence a high level of k makes R&D more effective in accumulating A. Thus, this model 
incorporates both the effect of technology on capital accumulation, and the reverse effect 
from capital accumulation to increased technology adoption. 
Ak L Y y = ≡ /
a
Third, a country’s R&D investment is the sum of R&D performed by firms, who 
undertake R&D together with accumulation of physical capital to maximize the present 
value of their future stream of profits, which are equal to total income net of wages paid 
and net of taxes. Apart from general income taxes, there are also policies and institutions 
that affect the cost of R&D, which the model captures by the parameter φ , so that the 
unit cost of R&D in terms of units of output is  φ + 1 . Apart from this implicit R&D tax, 
the model allows for an R&D externality, so that a firm’s A increases not only thanks to 
its own R&D, but also thanks to R&D performed by other firms in the economy. A 
parameter  µ  between zero and one captures this externality, with  0 = µ  implying no 
externalities and  1 = µ  implying full externalities, in the sense that A is determined 
completely by average R&D efforts among all the firms in the economy.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
7 The reader may be concerned that this formulation implies that all TFP differences result from differences 
in technology adoption. This issue is explored quantitatively below. 
  16The firm’s decision about how much to invest is determined by a dynamic 
optimization problem, which yields two first-order conditions: one for investment in 
physical capital, and one for R&D. The first-order condition for investment in physical 
capital yields the following steady-state restriction: 
 















) / ( 
where τ  is the tax on profits, and r is the equilibrium steady-state real interest rate, which 
is assumed equal across countries. Assuming a common interest rate across countries, and 
using data for each country for p and k, equation (2) yields an implicit τ  for each 
country. Note that τ and r are interchangeable—that is, the model cannot differentiate 
between low accumulation due to high taxes or low finance, since both work through the 
same channels. However, the analysis assumes that r is the same across countries, so that 
all international differences in the nominal capital-output ratio are explained by 
differences in tax rates. 
The second first-order condition determines R&D, and hence relative A in steady 
state. This condition is: 
 
(3)       r a a ga a k = − + − − − − Ω ) 1 ( ) 1 /( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ε λ α  
 
where (1 )(1 )/(1 ) τ µ Ω= − − +φ  is a composite distortion term that captures the effect of 
taxes and externalities. To see this better, the difference between the social and the 
private rate of return to R&D can be shown to be equal to: 
 
L g a k r r + − − Ω − = − ) 1 ( ) 1 )( 1 ( ~ λ α  
 
where   is the rate of growth of the labor force. The wedge between the social and 
private rates of return to R&D thus has two components. The first is generated by taxes 
and the domestic R&D externality, as captured by the term 
L g
Ω. The second is associated 
with the rate of growth of firms, which in the model is equal to the rate of growth of the 
labor force, and arises because of the assumption that new firms are born with a 
productivity equal to the average productivity of existing firms. Equation (3) determines 
  17a country’s relative level of A given the country’s measured levels of k and the two tax 






For calibration, the model follows Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare (2005) so that  3 / 1 = α , 
085 . 0 = γ ,  . 0 = ,  ,  086 . 0 = r 015 . 0 = = ε g ,  38 . 0 = λ , and  55 . 0 = µ . The interested 
reader can consult that paper to understand the details of this calibration. Here we just 
provide a brief explanation. The values used for the parameters α ,  γ , and δ  are 
standard in the literature. The interest rate is obtained by noting that with a tax rate of 25 
percent in the United States (that is,  25 . 0 = τ ) and given data for the capital-output ratio 
and the relative price of investment in the United States, then equation (2) implies 
. The steady-state growth rate of A*, g, is obtained from the average growth of 
TFP in the OECD for the period 1960-2000. The analysis assumes that 
086 . 0 = r
g = ε  to generate 
reasonable steady-state properties. Finally, parameters λ  and µ  are calibrated to U.S. 
data. In particular, these parameters are set to make the social rate of return to R&D in 
the United States three times the net private rate of return given an R&D subsidy of 20 






Table 4 presents the results of this exercise for several Latin American countries plus the 
United States. These results are only suggestive, since they are affected by the 
measurement error intrinsic to international databases, such as those of Barro and Lee 
(2000) and the Penn World Table 6.1. Although useful for generating broad international 
stylized facts, such databases are too noisy to be reliable in undertaking a country-
specific analysis. Moreover, although the calibrated model is a good approximation for 
                                                           
8 The assumption that the United States has a 20 percent subsidy on R&D may be questioned for two 
reasons. First, although this is the statutory rate (see Hall and Van Reenen 2000), the effective rate is much 
lower. Second, since this analysis considers a broad concept of R&D, the actual rate would be even lower. 
It turns out, however, that this is not too relevant for the main conclusions. Recalibrating the model with a 
U.S. R&D tax of 0 percent does not change the results in any significant way.  
  18broad international patterns, it may be way off for particular countries.  A serious analysis 
for a particular country necessarily entails obtaining better data and adjusting the model 
for country idiosyncrasies. The relevance of this approach is illustrated below for the case 
of Chile.  
Columns 1-3 in Table 4 come from Barro-Lee data on human capital and the Penn 
World Tables, using  3 / 1 = α , 085 . 0 = γ , and a procedure to construct capital stock as 
described in Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare (2005). Column 4 calculates the income tax τ  
implied by equation (2) above assuming that all countries have the same interest rate as in 
the United States, calibrated above as r = 8.6 percent. Mexico has the lowest implied 
income tax and a physical capital-output ratio equal to that of the United States in spite of 
having a relative price of capital that is twice as high. The only way for this to be an 
equilibrium is to have an income tax much smaller than that of the United States.  
Column 5 presents the composite capital-output ratio   as a ratio 
of the U.S. level. Column 6 uses equation (3) to calculate the value of   assuming that all 
countries have the same implicit tax on R&D as that in the United States (
) 1 /( ) / (
α α − ≡ Y K h k
a
= 2 . 0 − φ ) and 
presents it as a ratio of the U.S. level. Column 7 shows the associated R&D investment 
rate, using equation (1). Column 8 shows the product of relative k and relative a, which 
yields labor productivity relative to the United States. Thus, for example, if Chile had 
2 . 0 − = φ , given its levels of human capital, the relative price of investment, and the (real) 
physical capital-output ratio K/Y, then its labor productivity would be 38 percent of that 
of the United States. Column 9 presents the social rate of return to R&D given  2 . 0 − = φ . 
The exercise continues in columns 10-13 of Table 4. Columns 10 and 11 show 
labor productivity and technology level A calculated directly from the data expressed as 
ratios of corresponding U.S. levels, respectively. (The level of A is obtained from y and k 
by applying y = Ak). Column 12 calculates the R&D investment rate implied by a 
country’s “measured”   using equation (1). Finally, column 13 shows the R&D tax  a φ  
necessary for the model to be consistent with this R&D investment rate. Comparison of 
columns 6-8 with columns 10-12 reveals the impact of innovation policies and 
regulations, and column 13 summarizes this comparison in a single index. Finally, 
column 14 presents the implied social rate of return to R&D. 
  19By way of illustration, consider the case of Peru. According to the model, with 
2 . 0 − = φ , Peru’s labor productivity would be 61 percent of the U.S. level, rather than the 
18 percent recorded in the data. The reason for this is that given its (implied) low income 
tax (τ = 9 percent), a 20 percent R&D subsidy ( 2 . 0 − = φ ) would lead Peru to an R&D 
investment rate of 3 percent, implying a steady-state technology index equal to 93 percent 
of the U.S. level. By contrast, Peru’s actual R&D rate is only 0.4 percent, implying a 
level of A of only 28 percent of the U.S. level, and hence a labor productivity of only 18 
percent of the U.S. level. For this to be an equilibrium phenomenon, the model requires 
an R&D tax of 154 percent, which implies a social rate of return to R&D of 51 percent. 
Thus, Peru appears to suffer from a true innovation problem, that is, a case of policies 
and institutions that negatively affect broad R&D. 
Something quite different happens in Chile. In this case, the labor productivity 
that would obtain with a 20 percent R&D subsidy would be 38 percent, which is very 
similar to what is recorded in the data. In both the hypothetical and actual cases, the 
implied R&D investment rate is close to 2 percent. In line with this, the model’s implied 
R&D tax for Chile is –24 percent. Thus, according to this exercise, Chile’s problem is 
entirely driven by its low h and its high implicit income tax τ . In other words, it is an 
accumulation problem rather than an innovation problem. 
The case of El Salvador illustrates the other extreme. The country has low levels 
of h and K/Y (k = 0.3 relative to the United States). Thus, it would be expected that El 
Salvador would have a low relative A level (38 percent of the U.S. level); instead, it has a 
high relative A of 72 percent, implying a high R&D investment rate of 3.3 percent. 
Hence, it must have policies and institutions that favor R&D: the model implies that El 
Salvador enjoys an R&D subsidy of 53 percent, which is significantly higher than the one 
in the United States.  
To summarize the previous results, the exercise suggests (again, remember these 
results are only suggestive; more elaborate country-specific analysis is required to 
explore individual countries) high R&D taxes in Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, and Peru, 
and medium R&D taxes in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, and Venezuela. Chile, Colombia, 
El Salvador, and Uruguay appear to have favorable R&D institutions and regulations. 
  20The first group of countries has an innovation problem, whereas the problem in the latter 
group is one of accumulation. The first group of countries would benefit from adopting 
policies and regulations more favorable to innovation. For example, Panama’s R&D 
investment rate would increase from 0.6 to 2.9 percent of GDP if it could go from 
17 . 1 = φ  to  2 . 0 − = φ , leading to an increase in its labor productivity relative to the 
United States from 27 to 63 percent. Of course, this is not to say that this is a simple 
matter of innovation or tax policy. As discussed below, the institutions and regulations 
that determine the effective R&D implicit tax are much more complex. For the group of 
countries with favorable innovation institutions and regulations, there is little to gain 
from additional efforts in this dimension.
9 
The next subsection explains columns 15-17 of Table 4. The last column of the 
table shows the measured R&D investment rate. All the implied R&D investment rates of 
column 12 are higher than the measured ones in column 18. This reveals that measured 
R&D is significantly lower than the model’s implied R&D including technology adoption 
efforts. This should not be surprising: measured R&D only considers a small portion of 
overall innovative and technology adoption efforts, since the formal definition of R&D 
excludes investments that would normally be included as technology adoption.
10 Indeed, 
an advantage of the approach taken here is that the R&D measure is really a more general 
measure of innovative effort that is mapped to the TFP measures plugged into the model.  
In this way, the analysis avoids some issues complicating innovation diagnostics 
mentioned earlier.  First, it includes technology adoption efforts that the formal 
measurement of R&D would likely omit. Second, it implicitly takes into account 
international differences in the effectiveness with which R&D is turned into useful 
                                                           
9 Of course, this does not mean that these countries should not continue to improve their innovation 
policies. Even with a 20 percent R&D subsidy, the social rate of return is relatively high. For example, the 
implied rate of return to R&D in Chile is 26 percent, just as in the United States, and considerably higher 
than the private rate of return. Clearly, it makes sense to provide even stronger support to R&D. The point 
is that this is no longer the source of divergence from U.S. productivity levels. 
10 One complication that arises here is that although the analysis uses a broad definition of R&D, it 
nevertheless uses the measured 2.5 percent R&D investment rate in the United States, as well as the official 
R&D subsidy in the calibration. There are two reasons why this is not likely to be a serious problem. First, 
the bias in the measurement of R&D must be much stronger in developing countries than in the United 
States because the main problem arises from the lack of measurement of technology adoption as opposed to 
innovative efforts. Second, the results do not change in a significant way if instead the model is calibrated 
to a broader concept of R&D in the United States. 
  21knowledge, resulting—among other factors—from differences in the fraction of R&D 
that is financed by governments across countries.  
 
The Role of Distortions 
 
So far the model has assumed that all TFP differences across countries result from 
differences in R&D or technology adoption. Thus, it leaves no room for distortions acting 
through other channels, such as trade barriers that decrease efficiency directly or 
regulations that lead firms to adopt suboptimal combinations of inputs. An interesting 
area for future research is precisely to explore ways to identify the relevance of barriers 
to technology adoption and direct distortions for international TFP differences. This 
section undertakes a simple exercise to explore the distortions that would be necessary to 
account for observed productivity levels if countries had the same R&D policy and 
institutions as the United States ( 2 . 0 − = φ ).  
Here distortions are modeled as a factor z that directly reduces output: 
1 () YKz A h L
α α − =
h
. Everything else is as in the model presented above. The analysis of 
steady-state equilibrium is exactly as above but human capital per worker is   instead 
of  . This implies that now 
zh
/(1 ) (/) kz h K Y
α α − ≡ . For any particular country, what is the 
value of the distortions variable z such that the data and the model are consistent when 
2 . 0 − = φ ? The result is presented in column 15; columns 16 and 17 present the implied 
R&D investment rate and the associated social rate of return to R&D.  
Consider Peru again. Instead of being a case of failed development due to 
perverse innovation policies and institutions, it is now seen as an economy plagued by 
distortions that by themselves explain a labor productivity level of 30 percent of the U.S. 
level.
11 More generally, the countries that in the previous exercise (column 13) were 
classified as having the highest levels of φ , are now portrayed as having the lowest levels 
of z (highest distortions). The problem with this analysis is that it is difficult to know 
what are the specific distortions and through what channels they would generate such 
                                                           
11 This effect of distortions takes into account their total effect, both the direct effect through a lower TFP, 
and the indirect effect through a lower capital stock given a constant capital-output ratio (and constant rate 
of return to capital). 
  22enormous static productivity losses. Moreover, it is difficult to compare this with the 
opposite scenario, in which barriers to technology adoption explain Peru’s low 
productivity. The latter scenario would entail  55 . 1 = φ , which implies that firms face a 
cost of R&D in terms of output that is approximately three times higher than in the 
United States. The distortions analysis provides an explanation only for the overall 
productivity loss resulting from unknown distortions; the barriers to technology adoption 
analysis reveals the specific wedge needed to create the technological backwardness 
consistent with that productivity loss. 
The model without distortions used for the analysis in the previous subsection 
suggests that some Latin American countries suffer true innovation problems. An 
alternative explanation is that rather than lack of innovation, these economies suffer from 
severe distortions that directly lower TFP. More research is necessary to understand how 
to disentangle static distortions from barriers to technology adoption. For now, the 
analysis proceeds (mostly) under the assumption that distortions play no role in 
explaining low productivity levels. 
 
The Case of Chile 
 
One limitation of the analysis so far is that it relies on international databases and 
assumes common parameters. Although this is fine for establishing stylized facts, it is not 
satisfactory for analyzing a particular country. This section considers two specific issues. 
First, some countries may exhibit a high measured TFP as result of their large 
endowment of natural resources. Ideally, the analysis should correct for this to make the 
results comparable across countries. Second, although the assumption of a constant 
Mincer coefficient may be a good approximation when studying broad regularities in the 
data, this is no longer the case for considering a particular country. In that case, it is much 
better to use the particular Mincer coefficient for the country in question. The exploration 
of these two issues for the case of Chile starts by assuming that there are no distortions 
(that is, z = 1). 
First consider the impact of natural resources. In the case of Chile, a significant 
part of GDP is not so much the result of using human and physical capital according to 
  23the production function above, but rather the result of using the country’s large 
endowment of mineral resources. According to the Central Bank, mining contributed 6.7 
percent of GDP in 1999, and according to the 1998 Household Survey, employment in 
this sector accounted for 1.6 percent of total employment.  Assuming that the physical 
and human capital stocks per worker were the same in mining as in the rest of the 
economy, this implies that pure natural resources in mining account for approximately 5 
percent of GDP. 
Table 5 shows the results of this adjustment. The first row replicates the exercise 
above, while the second row shows the adjusted results. The implied capital-output ratio 
increases, implying a drop in the implicit income tax from 37 to 34 percent.  In addition, 
there is a small increase in k and a small decrease in the relative technology index. For 
this new relative technology index to be consistent with the model above, it is necessary 
to have a smaller R&D subsidy, which is calculated now to be 9 percent. Thus, Chile’s 
problem remains one of accumulation and not one of innovation.  
The third row of Table 5 turns to the second adjustment mentioned above: Chile’s 
estimated Mincer coefficient rather than the common coefficient imposed for the exercise 
in Table 1. The estimated TFP (and hence the estimated technology index A) is quite 
sensitive to the Mincer coefficient. For example, according to Arellano and Braun (1999), 
the Mincer coefficient in Chile is close to 0.12.  Using this coefficient, h increases from 
1.85 to 2.39, which by itself would imply a decline in A of 23 percent.  Together with the 
mining adjustment above,   falls to 51 percent of the U.S. level.  The R&D investment 
rate and the R&D implicit tax that go with this (according to the model) are 0.8 percent 
and 50 percent, respectively.
12 Chile now appears to have an innovation problem. 
a
Is the upward adjustment to the Mincer parameter driving these results 
reasonable? Theory offers little advice: on the one hand, educational quality is likely to 
be lower in Chile than in the OECD; on the other hand, education stock is lower and 
hence, ceteris paribus, the return should be higher.  However, the finding has empirical 
precedent.  The adjusted rate is the same as the one Bils and Klenow (2000) borrowed 
                                                           
12 Interestingly, the 0.8 percent implied R&D investment rate is now close to the measured rate for Chile, 
which averaged 0.6 percent for 1990-2000 (see Lederman and Sáenz, 2002). 
  24from Psacharopoulos (1994) and substantially below Lam and Schoeni’s (1993) estimate 
for Brazil. 
What would be the required distortions to explain Chile’s low TFP after the 
previous adjustments? Row 4 of Table 5 presents an exercise similar to the one 
performed in the previous section to determine the distortions that would be necessary to 
explain Chile’s lower TFP level given an R&D subsidy of 20 percent. The result is that 
distortions would have to be such as to reduce Chile’s labor productivity by 27 percent.  
Although this analysis cannot say whether this number is reasonable, it seems that it 
would be difficult to argue that Chile is so much more inefficient than the United States 
as to generate such a large direct fall in TFP. Still, this clearly remains an open question 
for research. 
In summary, adjusting for the impact of natural-resource abundance and a higher 
than average return on schooling, the analysis for Chile changes radically: these 
adjustments lead to a lower TFP, a lower implied R&D investment rate, and a higher 
innovation tax. More broadly, the analysis suggests that Chile’s low labor productivity is 
the result of four factors. First, the country’s high income tax leads to a lower capital-
output ratio that by itself would lead to a labor productivity level 16 percent lower than 
the U.S. level. Second, the lower average mean years of schooling of the adult population 
by itself would lead to 11 percent lower labor productivity than in the United States. 
Third, distortions would cause a decline in labor productivity of 27 percent. And fourth, 
unfavorable policies and institutions for innovation would lower R&D from 1.9 to 0.8 
percent and reduce labor productivity by 27 percent. 
 
4. Explaining Innovation Problems 
 
The previous sections have explored the idea that some countries suffer from policies and 
institutions that adversely affect innovation and technology adoption, resulting in lower 
productivity relative to high-innovation countries. Application of the developed 
framework to Chile showed that, after some adjustments—and assuming the distortions 
are not unusually large—the country appears to suffer from this problem. What market, 
government, or other failures might make it somehow more difficult in Chile to 
  25accumulate the factors associated with a higher TFP relative to its accumulation of 
human and physical capital? 
  Four broad categories come to mind: labor market rigidities, lack of human 
resources, lack of credit, and absence of policies to internalize externalities.  
 
Labor Market Rigidities 
 
The recent theoretical literature on explaining international TFP differences points to 
barriers to technology adoption, which usually means labor market rigidities that prevent 
firms from adopting new technologies that would negatively affect particular groups of 
workers (see, for example, Parente and Prescott, 1994). Indeed, in a recent survey in 
Chile, firms cited resistance to change and costs of reducing employment as barriers to 
adopting technologies (Benevente, 2004). This is consistent with studies showing that 
Chile’s severance costs are substantially above those in the OECD (Heckman and Pagé, 
2004), although they are substantially below those in much of the rest of Latin America. 
Recent empirical work on the impact of the rigidities is somewhat mixed. Caballero, 
Engel, and Micco (2004) find that job security hampers the creative destruction process 
and that moving from the 20th to 80th percentile in job security cuts 1 percent from 
annual productivity growth. For Chile, they calculate that raising flexibility to U.S. levels 
would lead to an initial gain between 2 and 4 percent and permanent gains in the 
structural rate of growth of 0.3 percent. On the other hand, working at the firm level in 
Argentina, Galiani (2005) somewhat surprisingly finds only a fragile relationship 
between the degree of rigidity in union contracts and firms’ innovative behavior.   
Furthermore, Europe’s labor legislation cannot be termed flexible. A fair reading of the 
limited evidence probably suggests continuing agnosticism on the true magnitude of 
these effects. 
 
Credit Markets  
 
According to the recent survey mentioned earlier, firms in Chile do not undertake more 
innovation because of the associated high technical risk and long gestation periods. This 
could be seen as broadly mapping into the market failures standard in the literature: 
  26individual firms cannot handle the lumpiness, risk, and long gestation periods of 
innovation projects. This points clearly to credit market failures. 
  Recent micro-estimates for Chile by Benevente, de Gregorio and Núñez (2005) 
suggest that own rates of return to R&D are high. In particular, they estimate rates of 
around 30 percent to R&D, whereas the (gross) returns to physical capital are 16 percent. 
The higher private rates of return to R&D may be due to its higher risk. They may also be 
associated with the fact that it more difficult to finance, both because of higher risk 
together with absence of venture capital, and because of the fact that R&D leads to the 
accumulation of assets that are more difficult to use as collateral. 
  Innovation surveys again suggest that the vast majority of financing of innovative 
activities is internal, potentially suggesting an inability to share risk.  That said, there is 
no consensus on why specialized institutions, such as venture capital, have not taken hold 
in Chile. Some venture capital firms have folded allegedly for lack of “deal flow,” which 
might imply that there is inadequate financing at the early stages of idea development that 
would generate demand downstream.  However, recent entrants into the market suggest 
that deal flow is adequate, but that the design of previous venture capital operations failed 
to pay sufficient attention to the provision of complementary management and mentoring 
services that are generally part of venture capital packages.
13 Furthermore, legislation has 
tied the development of specific institutions to the intermediation of pension fund assets 
and hence burdened them with inappropriate regulation on risk taking (Arrau, 2002). 
However, it is worth highlighting that venture capital is virtually absent in Spain and 
Italy, so it is difficult to assert that this missing market is an insuperable barrier to gains 
in TFP. 
 
Lack of Human Resources 
 
Ideally, the analysis could simply look at wages and their distribution according to levels 
of schooling and professions to determine whether there is a scarcity of human resources 
crucial to innovation and technology adoption. The problem is that this presumes that 
demand and supply are independent, whereas in this case it is likely that—at least to 
                                                           
13 Discussions with Eduardo Bitráan and Patricio Arrau, respectively. 
  27some extent—supply creates its own demand, and demand depends on the supply of 
human resources. Very innovative firms are often spin-offs of university research.   
Managers in firms with a taste for innovation are likely to have an academic background.  
In Finland, the most important dimension of university-private sector linkages is reported 
to be masters students doing their theses in the firms.  It may be that such exchanges help 
define the frontier of the field and possible areas for innovation investment.  For example, 
it would be easy to imagine a country where entrepreneurs have little idea of the location 
of the frontier and thus available investment opportunities, and as a result have no 
demand for the products of the science establishment.  In this case, no excess demand 
will appear for the products of a scientific establishment.  Multiple-equilibrium models 
consistent with this type of idea have been elaborated by Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes 
(2005). 
 
Policies and Institutions   
 
A critical problem in the area of innovation is the existence of externalities. This implies 
that policies and institutions that internalize such externalities are crucial. Perhaps 
developing countries, and Chile in particular, suffer from policies and institutions that do 
not perform this function. Although Fundación Chile and the national Development 
Corporation (Corporación de Fomento, CORFO) are recognized for work in this area, the 
overall effort may be insufficient.  
  An important area is that of collaboration and linkages between universities and 
the private sector. University private-sector collaboration is a common way of shifting 
the long-term risk of basic science or difficult-to-appropriate investments from the 
individual firm.  Clearly, universities are also the source of qualified personnel, the lack 
of which is cited as a barrier to innovation.  In an inversion of what is found in the 
OECD, in Chile most research is done by, and most researchers are found in, universities 
rather than the private sector and there is evidence that firms have difficulty accessing 
them.  In theory, skills shortages would be revealed by a high wage premium for 
scientists and engineers, although analysis to date has only identified the general rising 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
  28premium to tertiary education found globally. However, surveys of private firms suggest, 
for example, that Chile ranks globally very low on collaboration between the private and 
university sectors.
14 Although most major universities have offices to promote linkages, 
only the Universidad de Concepción has incentives for faculty to collaborate with the 





Countries have innovation shortfalls, but this paper has argued that their diagnosis 
requires more than simple unconditional comparisons of R&D or other related indicators.  
Standard issues of comparative advantage influence the optimal level of knowledge 
accumulation and generation.  Furthermore, even if low levels of innovation are 
conditionally established, it is not immediately clear whether the problem pertains 
particularly to this factor, or whether there are barriers to accumulation more generally 
that need to be addressed.  This paper offers approaches to both issues and illustrates their 
application for Chile, a country that is currently thinking seriously about improving its 
innovation policy. The results that emerge suggest that Chile does indeed suffer from a 
true innovation shortfall, and the analysis offers some tentative ideas on what may be 
causing it. Clearly, further refinements would be valuable for both technique and data.   
                                                           
14 World Economic Forum (various issues).  Only 12 percent of Chilean firms have signed agreements with 
universities, compared with 40 percent in Finland (de Ferranti et al., 2003). 
15 Mullin (2005). 
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  32Table 1. R&D Investment Rates by Sector and Standard 
Deviation 
 
1985 2000 1985 2000
Manufacturing, utilities, construction and services 0.014 0.013 0.005 0.007
TOTAL MANUFACTURING 0.060 0.067 0.025 0.035
Food products, beverages and
b
0.012 0.013 0.007 0.007
Food products and
b
0.005 0.012 0.002 0.008
Tobacco products 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.000
Textiles, textile products, leather and
f
0.007 0.011 0.005 0.010
Textiles 0.009 0.016 0.005 0.012
Wearing apparel, dressing and dyeing of
f
0.001 0.010 0.000 0.022
Leather, leather products and
f
0.003 0.004 0.003 0.022
Wood, paper, printing,
bli hi
0.006 0.007 0.005 0.006
Wood and products of wood and
k
0.003 0.005 0.006 0.011
Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and
bli hi
0.006 0.007 0.006 0.007
Paper and paper products 0.007 0.008 0.013 0.012
Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded
di
0.001 0.002 0.001 0.005
Chemical, rubber, plastics and fuel
d
0.101 0.103 0.033 0.055
Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear
fl
0.057 0.027 0.042 0.023
Chemicals and chemical
d
0.130 0.147 0.045 0.074
Chemicals excluding
hi l
0.098 0.067 0.038 0.039
Pharmaceuticals 0.248 0.251 0.103 0.158
Rubber and plastics products 0.023 0.028 0.044 0.060
Other nonmetallic mineral
d
0.016 0.015 0.015 0.014
Basic metals and fabricated metal
d
0.015 0.016 0.009 0.010
Basic metals 0.026 0.029 0.012 0.016
Iron and steel 0.024 0.022 0.012 0.020
Nonferrous metals 0.047 0.028 0.040 0.023
Fabricated metal products, except machinery and
i
0.011 0.009 0.006 0.011
Machinery and equipment, instruments and transport
i
0.119 0.145 0.048 0.062
Machinery and equipment, 0.043 0.067 0.030 0.028
Electrical and optical
i
0.178 0.242 0.066 0.153
Office, accounting and computing
hi
0.243 0.274 0.089 0.783
Electrical machinery and apparatus, 0.091 0.080 0.239 0.053
Radio, television and communication
i
0.231 0.186 0.094 0.438
Medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and
lk
0.119 0.154 0.083 0.101
Transport vehicles 0.103 0.085 0.094 0.067
Motor vehicles, trailers and
ii l
0.104 0.101 0.068 0.070
Other transport equipment 0.160 0.124 0.177 0.072
Building and repairing of ships and
b
0.022 0.025 0.012 0.027
Aircraft and spacecraft 0.289 0.212 0.287 0.079
Railroad equipment and transport equipment 0.042 0.094 0.049 0.076
Furniture; manufacturing 0.005 0.025 0.000 0.007
ELECTRICITY, GAS AND WATER
SUPPLY
0.006 0.006 0.007 0.005
CONSTRUCTION 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002
TOTAL SERVICES 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.002
Simple Correlation   0.9539
Spearman Correlation test.  Prob > |t| =
Median R&D investment rate Standard deviation Sector
 
 Source: OECD Structural Analysis Data Base. 
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Australia 0.007 0.008 0.886
Belgium 0.007 0.014 0.471
Canada 0.007 0.011 0.645
Czech Republic 0.005 0.008 0.550
Germany 0.004 0.017 0.259
Denmark 0.011 0.015 0.750
Spain 0.002 0.005 0.509
Finland 0.008 0.021 0.365
France 0.007 0.015 0.433
United Kingdom 0.010 0.014 0.724
Italy 0.005 0.006 0.846
Japan 0.010 0.020 0.531
Korea 0.006 0.019 0.329
Netherlands 0.006 0.012 0.507
Norway 0.011 0.012 0.929
Poland 0.002 0.003 0.486
Sweden 0.014 0.030 0.475
United States 0.011 0.019 0.567
 
Note: Applies Chile’s sector shares in value added to OECD country’s 
 R&D investment rates.  
Source: UNCTAD; Central Bank of Chile. 


















Food products and beverages 0.059 0.028 0.009 -0.031 -0.029 -0.06
Tobacco products 0.008 0.002 0.010 -0.006 -0.006 -0.01
Textiles 0.007 0.007 0.013 0.000 -0.001 0.00
Wearing apparel, dressing and dying of fur 0.006 0.005 0.004 -0.001 0.000 0.00
Leather, leather products and footwear 0.005 0.002 0.006 -0.003 -0.002 0.00
Pulp, paper and paper products 0.013 0.008 0.028 -0.005 -0.015 -0.03
Printing and publishing 0.012 0.012 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.00
Wood and products of wood and cork 0.012 0.006 0.004 -0.006 -0.003 -0.01
Chemicals and chemical products 0.019 0.020 0.109 0.001 0.007 0.01
Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 0.017 0.006 0.029 -0.010 -0.029 -0.06
Rubber and plastics products 0.007 0.008 0.034 0.002 0.006 0.01
Iron and steel 0.005 0.007 0.022 0.003 0.006 0.01
Nonferrous metals 0.003 0.003 0.025 0.000 0.000 0.00
Other non-metallic mineral products 0.012 0.010 0.015 -0.002 -0.002 0.00
Fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment 0.013 0.015 0.011 0.002 0.003 0.01
Machinery and equipment, n.e.c. 0.003 0.018 0.052 0.015 0.077 0.16
Electrical machinery and apparatus, n.e.c. 0.002 0.024 0.153 0.022 0.341 0.71
Transport Equipment 0.006 0.018 0.099 0.012 0.118 0.25
Furniture; manufacturing n.e.c. 0.006 0.008 0.014 0.002 0.003 0.01
Recycling 0.000 0.001 0.016 0.001 0.001 0.00
Construction 0.114 0.063 0.002 -0.052 -0.011 -0.02
Utilities 0.035 0.028 0.006 -0.007 -0.004 -0.01
Services 0.636 0.702 0.003 0.066 0.022 0.05
Total 1.000 1.003 0.003 0.481 1.000
Note: Sectors selection is based on the highest possible level of desegregation for Chile. n.e.c.: not elsewhere classified.
Source: UNCTAD; Central Bank of Chile.  
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   1                                    2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
Country  h  p  K/Y  tau  k  A (1)  sR (1) y (1) SRR (1) y (D)  A (D)  sR (2)  Phi (2) SRR (2) z  Imp. sR (z) SRR (z) sR (D)
Argentina  2.1                      1.2 1.5 11% 0.7 94% 3.0% 66% 21%  44% 63% 1.2% 61% 37%  0.5 2.4%  19% 0.4%
Bolivia  1.6                              1.8 0.8 28% 0.4 57% 1.9% 22% 23% 12% 30% 0.7% 18% 30% 0.7 1.1% 21% 0.4%
Brazil  1.5                              1.3 1.7 -7% 0.5 90% 3.5% 47% 17% 33% 64% 1.7% 41% 27% 0.6 2.9% 16% 0.9%
Chile  1.9                              1.1 1.1 37% 0.5 69% 1.8% 38% 27% 39% 72% 2.0% -24% 26% 1.1 1.9% 27% 0.6%
Colombia  1.5                              1.6 0.9 23% 0.4 63% 2.1% 26% 22% 22% 53% 1.5% -4% 25% 0.8 1.9% 21% 0.3%
Ecuador  1.7                              1.1 1.6 12% 0.6 87% 2.9% 51% 20% 23% 39% 0.7% 91% 41% 0.4 1.6% 18% 0.1%
Mexico  1.8                              1.4 1.7 -19% 0.7 101% 4.0% 67% 16% 37% 57% 1.1% 125% 38% 0.4 3.0% 14% 0.3%
Panama  2.0                              1.2 1.5 14% 0.7 92% 2.9% 63% 21% 27% 39% 0.6% 118% 47% 0.4 1.6% 18% 0.4%
Peru  1.9                              1.1 1.6 10% 0.7 93% 3.0% 61% 20% 18% 28% 0.4% 155% 51% 0.3 1.3% 17% 0.1%
El Salvador  1.5                              2.0 0.7 36% 0.3 38% 1.2% 13% 24% 24% 72% 3.3% -53% 16% 1.7 1.9% 26% 0.3%
Uruguay  1.9                              1.0 1.1 44% 0.5 61% 1.5% 33% 29% 35% 65% 1.7% -25% 28% 1.1 1.6% 30% 0.3%
Venezuela  1.8                              1.3 1.5 4% 0.6 91% 3.2% 55% 19% 36% 61% 1.3% 53% 32% 0.5 2.6% 17% 0.5%
United States  2.7                            0.9 1.7 25% 1.0 100% 2.5% 100% 26% 100% 100% 2.5% -20% 26% 1.0 2.5% 26% 2.5%
(1) These are calculations assuming that all countries have the same R&D subsidy as the U.S. 
(2) These are calculations using the data and the model to obtain the implied R&D investment rate, the implied R&D tax and the associated social rate of 
return to R&D. 
(z) These are calculations where all countries have the same R&D subsidy as the U.S. but have distortions that yield their measured income and TFP levels. 
(D) These are calculations based directly on the data. 
Source: Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare (2005); authors’ calculations. 





Table 5. Limitations of International Databases and Common Parameters in Chile 
 
  1 2  3  3  4  5  6  7  8 9 
  K/Y  τ   z  k  Rel. k  Data rel. Y/L Data rel.  a Implied    R s φ   SRR
Chile (1)  1.15  37%  1  1.98 0.55  39%  72%  2%  -24% 26% 
Chile (2)  1.21  34%  1  2.04 0.56  37%  66%  1.7%  -9%  28% 
Chile (3)  1.21  34%  1  2.62 0.72  37%  51%  0.8%  50%  44% 
Chile (4)  1.21  34%  0.73  1.93 0.53  37%  70%  1.9%  -20% 25% 
 Source: Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare (2005) and authors’ calculations. 
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Figure 4. Investment in Research and Development: Contribution of Economic Structure 
Compared with Deviations from OECD Mean Aggregate Value 
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